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EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE: HOLLAND AND THE
UNITED STATES FACE THE DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of euthanasia has received considerable public atten-
tion recently,' although there are still many misconceptions concerning
what is meant by the term.2 For many people, euthanasia may bring to
mind the atrocities of the Nazis, who directed their campaigns at the
handicapped, mentally and chronically ill, and racially undesirable.3
The term is now commonly defined as "painlessly putting to death per-
sons suffering from [an] incurable and distressing disease as an act of
mercy."'
Most acts of euthanasia are defined under two sets of criteria: vol-
untary or involuntary; active or passive." Voluntary euthanasia occurs
when the patient or patient's family consents to the procedure,' while
involuntary euthanasia occurs when consent is not or could not be ob-
tained." Active euthanasia is the giving of some substance to another
person that actually shortens that person's life,8 while passive euthana-
sia is the withdrawal of any life-sustaining equipment from a termi-
nally ill patient.9
The concept of euthanasia has created an ethical dilemma 0 for
doctors because they are indoctrinated with the philosophy that their
primary responsibility is to heal." They are surrounded by the tools of
technology, 2 all of which are designed to "continually enhance a doc-
tor's ability to prolong life."' 8 Some of these doctors are then faced
1. Note, Euthanasia: A Comparison of the Criminal Laws of Germany, Switzerland
and the United States, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 533, 535 (1983).
2. Id. at 534.
3. Aly & Roth, The Legalization of Mercy Killings in Medical and Nursing Institu-
tions in Nazi Germany from 1938 until 1941, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 145, 146 (1984).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979).
5. Note, supra note 1, at 534.
6. Id. at 536-37.
7. Id. at 537.
8. Id. at 539.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 533.
11. Klagsbrun, Changing Attitudes Toward Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA: A DECADE
OF CHANGE 56 (1979).
12. Id.
13. Note, supra note 1, at 536.
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with the situation in which a patient, stricken with a painful and incur-
able disease, has made the decision that it is time to die."' This patient
asks the physician for direct assistance in ending his life.1" It is at this
juncture that the difference between active and passive euthanasia is
believed to be crucial to medical ethics."6
The view followed in the United States is that, in some cases,
withholding treatment is permissible but taking any direct action
designed to terminate the patient's life is not." While active euthana-
sia is a felony under current United States law,' statutes allowing pas-
sive euthanasia (withholding treatment) have been enacted in a major-
ity of the states.' 9 The debate in the United States continues to focus
on passive euthanasia, since it is felt that the issue of active euthanasia
is much too controversial to consider at this time. 0
This Note is a comparative study of the medical and legal ap-
proaches to euthanasia in the United States and the Netherlands, a
country where active euthanasia is openly practiced. This Note is not
intended to make any moral judgments, nor address the moral issues
raised within a religious context.
II. THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch Government, confronted with a practice of open, active
euthanasia, is attempting to democratically decide if doctors should be
allowed to perform "active" euthanasia or "mercy" killing.2'
14. Klagsbrun, supra note 11, at 56.
15. Id.
16. Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING
240 (T. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978).
17. Id. In a recent poll conducted by the Journal of the American Bar Association,
56.8% of the lawyers surveyed believed that active euthanasia should be made available
to a terminally ill patient who requests it. Reidinger, Lawpoll, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1988, at
20.
18. Note, supra note 1, at 534.
19. Id. at 536.
20. Otten, Fateful Decision, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 1. This does not
mean that this issue is not being actively pursued. Americans Against Human Suffering
("A.A.H.S.") mounted a campaign in California to acquire enough signatures to get its
initiative on the ballot for the November 1988 elections. The group was seeking to have
enacted the Humane and Dignified Death Act ("H.D.D.A.") which would "permit" a
competent, terminal patient to receive a physician's aid in dying if he or she requests it.
Letter from Donald T. Gallagher, Chief Executive Officer of A.A.H.S., to Peter Zisser
(Dec. 5, 1987). A.A.H.S. was not successful in its efforts to acquire the necessary number
of signatures, but will try again in 1990 (after the required two-year waiting period for
reintroducing a peoples' initiative). Telephone interview with Shirley Marcus, A.A.H.S.
representative (Feb. 28, 1989).
21. Cody, Dutch Weigh Legalizing Euthanasia, Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1987, at
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Since the seventeenth century, the Dutch have followed a tradition
of "legal prohibition and practical tolerance.""2 It is their belief that
any type of behavior or activity can be tolerated, but they have tried to
limit the activity's influence if possible, thus effectively preventing
such behavior from entering the mainstream of Dutch society.2 3 Begin-
ning in 1965, the possibilities inherent in this social concept of indulg-
ing any behavior as long as it does not injure another person have been
enthusiastically explored.2 4 Among these forms of behavior are prosti-
tution and drug use. Prostitution is allowed but is limited to a "red
light" district in Amsterdam.2" "Hard" drugs, such as heroin and co-
caine, are still illegal, but only dealers can be prosecuted. Users are free
from any legal liability unless they commit other crimes.26 After twenty
years of welcoming what the Dutch called "drug tourists,"27 and watch-
ing the incidence of street crimes (such as thievery) increase dramati-
cally, 28 Amsterdam finally took action by limiting hard drug dealing to
a specific geographic zone (similar to the "red light" district).29 Only
recently has the city started to close down that area.30 Some hold the
view that the government of Holland will tolerate "little things, but if
you go too far, they'll smash you down." 31 The opposing view is that,
far from any "smashing down," the past twenty years have seen the
Dutch people "testing whether anything at all is too far. '32
A basic premise of Dutch culture is the belief that the government
and the law should be used as "instruments of altruism."3 3 More im-
portantly, the direction of the Dutch people and government has been
to address all problems openly, no matter how unpleasant or difficult,
and to incorporate the solution (if one can be found) into the law. 4 It
is with this attitude that the Netherlands has addressed the issue of
euthanasia.
The debate over euthanasia, or "mild death"3 5 as it is commonly
Al, col. 3.
22. Reeves, The Permissive Dutch, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1985, (Magazine), at 36.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Painton, Tolerance Finally Finds Its Limits, TIME, Aug. 31, 1987, at 28.
27. Reeves, supra note 22, at 38.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 101.
32. Id.
33. Painton, supra note 26, at 29.
34. Id.
35. Cody, supra note 21, at Al, col. 3.
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called in the Netherlands, has raged since the early 1970s."s It began in
1976, when the Dutch government adopted a recommendation made by
the Council of Europe that was primarily concerned with a patient's
right to refuse medical treatment. s7 The Council's recommendation was
only intended to address the situation where no "reasonable purpose"
would be served by continuing medical treatment.38 This form of pas-
sive euthanasia had already been the accepted medical practice in the
Netherlands."0 It is premised on the right of "informed consent," where
the decision to refuse treatment is made by a competent, well-informed
patient. As a result, no legal problems will arise.4 0 It follows from this
that a patient's "right to self-determination precludes the physician
from continuing treatment." 41 Patients must be informed when their
decisions are contrary to medical advice, but from that point on the
"responsibility rests completely with the patient. '4 This holds true
even if discontinuing the treatment ends in death.'3 Thus, the Dutch
view is that euthanasia does not occur when a patient refuses treat-
ment and consequently dies."
In 1985,' 5 the State Commission on Euthanasia" implemented the
definition of euthanasia that has become generally accepted in the
Netherlands: "Intentional life-termination by somebody else [other]
than the person concerned at [the] request of the latter.' '47 Actions
taken under this definition are currently illegal, and hold the doctor
liable under Section 293 of the Penal Code of the Netherlands. 4 This
36. H. van Zuydewijn, Euthanasia in the Netherlands (Mar. 23, 1987) (from a Dutch
Government release available from the Dutch Consulate).
37. DUTCH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AIDE-MEMOIRE ON THE SITUATION IN THE NETHER-
LANDS WITH REGARD TO EUTHANASIA 1 (1986) [hereinafter AIDE-MEMOIRE].
38. Id.
39. Cody, supra note 21, at A12, col. 2.
40. Gevers, Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the
Netherlands, 1 BIOETHICS 156 (1987).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. H. Leenen, Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the
Netherlands 1, 2 (unpublished manuscript, available from the Dutch Ministry of Health,
The Hague).
45. H. van Zuydewijn, supra note 36, at 1.
46. AIDE-MEMOIRE, supra note 37, at 1. The Commission was set up by the Dutch
Government to advise them on future policy concerning euthanasia "with special refer-
ence to legislation and the application of the law." Id.
47. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 3.
48. H. van Zuydewijn, supra note 36, at 1. Section 293 of the Penal Code of the
Netherlands provides that "any person who terminates the life of another person at the
latter's express and earnest request is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding
twelve years." Id.
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section of the Penal Code interprets the termination of a patient's life
on request as tantamount to murder or manslaughter, the circum-
stances of the request being the only mitigating factor."
A. The Courts
Although euthanasia is officially regarded as a criminal offense, it
is estimated that five thousand patients die each year in the Nether-
lands with the assistance of their doctors.50 The actions of these physi-
cians have essentially been supported by what can only be called a
"sympathetic" court. Since 1973 few doctors who have performed eu-
thanasia have been prosecuted, and those convicted have received only
token punishment."
The first case that considered the questions relevant to the accept-
ability of euthanasia 2 was decided by the Leeuwarden District Court
in 1973." A doctor had given her mother an overdose of morphine after
her mother's repeated requests to end her suffering.54 The doctor was
convicted, but was only sentenced to a "symbolic and conditional pun-
ishment."5 5 The Leeuwarden court, in limiting the lawful application of
euthanasia, held that it could only be applied in situations where the
49. Id.
50. Clines, Dutch Are Quietly Taking the Lead in Euthanasia, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1986, at A4, col. 1; see also Otten, supra note 20, at 1, col. 1, which puts the figure at
between one thousand and seven thousand deaths a year; Cody, supra note 21, at Al,
col. 3, which puts the figure at between six thousand and ten thousand deaths a year.
51. Otten, supra note 20, at 1, col. 2.
52. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 13 n.7. While there had been earlier cases involving
the taking of life for "merciful" reasons, the courts had not considered issues that were
relevant to the acceptability of euthanasia. Id.
53. Id. at 4. The Netherlands judicial system is comprised of four levels: 1) The Can-
tonal Court, which deals mostly in minor offenses such as traffic violations and most civil
cases of original jurisdiction. There are 62 Cantonal Courts, each representing a specific
geographical area (Canton); 2) The District Court, which tries all criminal cases involving
felonies, all civil cases outside the jurisdiction of the Cantonal Courts, and any appeals
from the Cantonal Courts. There are 19 District Courts, each covering three of four Can-
tons; 3) The Court of Appeals, which hears appeals from the District Courts. There are
five Courts of Appeals, each covering three or four districts; 4) The Supreme Court,
which is the court of last resort, where only questions of law are considered. See gener-
ally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE DUTCH COURT SYSTEM (1979) [hereinafter THE DUTCH
COURT SYSTEM].
54. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 13.
55. Id. At her trial, the doctor testified that her mother's "mental suffering became
unbearable . . . [that] was most important to me. Now, after all these months, I am
convinced I should have done it much earlier." Id. Owing to this admission, the court
found the doctor guilty, but she was only given a one week suspended sentence and one
year of probation. 0. RUSSELL. FREEDOM To DIE: MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF EUTHANA-
SIA 255-56 (rev. ed. 1977).
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patient was incurably ill, was suffering unbearably, and the termina-
tion of life was to be performed by the doctor who had treated the
patient (or one who was acting with him).5'
In 1981, the District Court of Rotterdam convicted a "lay person"
who had assisted in a suicide. 7 The court established a set of guide-
lines that closely paralleled the Leeuwarden criteria, but the guidelines
were applied here to the separate crime of "assistance to suicide."58
After this decision, the Minister of Justice moved for a coordinated
policy on prosecution by requiring that every euthanasia case be dis-
cussed by the heads of the prosecution department before they could
continue. 9
In 1983, the Alkmaar District Court acquitted a doctor who had
terminated the life of a ninety-five year old patient by giving her a
series of injections.6 0 The court based its decision on the patient's right
of "self-determination," holding that the act was "essentially not
wrongful.""1 The case was appealed to the Amsterdam Court of Ap-
peals, which reversed the Alkmaar court and convicted the doctor, al-
though imposing no punishment.e2 On November 27, 1984, the Su-
preme Court of the Netherlands reversed the Amsterdam Court of
Appeals."' The Supreme Court ruled that the Amsterdam court had
not examined "whether, according to responsible medical opinion mea-
sured according to the prevailing standards of medical ethics, an emer-
gency existed."6 4 The case was remanded with instructions to review
56. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 13.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 5. The Rotterdam criteria were: unbearable suffering; suffering and the de-
sire to die being continuous; the person concerned understands his situation and alterna-
tives and has weighed them; no other reasonable solution to improve the situation is
available; the death does not inflict unnecessary suffering on others; the decision to ter-
minate life may not be taken by one person; a doctor must be involved in all cases; and
the decision has to be made carefully. Id.
59. Id. Every court has its own public prosecutor's office. The public prosecutors are
collectively called the Public Prosecutions Department. The Minister of Justice can in-
struct the public prosecutor (all except the Attorney General at the Supreme Court) to
prosecute or not to prosecute. THE DUTCH COURT SYsTEM, supra note 53, at 7.
60. Gevers, supra note 40, at 159.
61. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Gevers, supra note 40, at 159. This "emergency" was based on the following facts:
[The] woman was seriously ill with no chance of improvement. The weekend
before her death, she suffered substantial deterioration, was unable to eat or
drink and lost consciousness. She had pleaded with the doctor several times to
put an end to her agony and after she became conscious again she declared that
she did not want to experience anything like that again and, with great empha-
sis, begged for euthanasia. Finally, the [doctor] decided to act according to her
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certain questions not addressed in the lower court: According to "pro-
fessional medical judgement," how much more deterioration in her per-
sonality and what increase in suffering was she to expect? Would the
patient soon be in a position where she would be unable to die with
dignity? Were there other ways to alleviate her suffering? 5 In 1986,
the doctor was finally acquitted by the Hague Court of Appeals, which
changed the term "responsible" to "reasonable" in assessing the medi-
cal judgment to be exercised."s
While the decisions of the Supreme Court opened the door to the
legalization of euthanasia on request, it still left both doctors and pa-
tients uncertain as to their liability.6 7 If the law was to be made "cer-
tain," that task rested with the legislative branch of the Dutch
government.6 8
B. The Legislature
In 1985, the State Commission on Euthanasia (Commission) sub-
mitted its report to the Dutch Government.6 ' In a 13 to 2 vote, the
Commission moved for changes in Sections 293 and 294 of the Penal
Code (concerning aiding a suicide)." The Commission recommended
that any intentional ending of a person's life on request should still be
punishable, but an exception should be made for doctors when their
patient's condition leaves no hope for any improvement, and the doc-
wishes as, in his opinion, every single day of life was nothing but a heavy burden
to the patient, whose suffering was unbearable.
Id.
65. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 6.
66. Id. This particular case was important because of the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands' tacit acceptance of euthanasia, even with the limitation on acceptable crite-
ria. There were other cases based on the force majeure criteria set in the Alkmeer case.
In one, the doctor was given a conditional sentence of two months. In the other, the
doctor was not punished for performing euthanasia, but did receive a penalty for issuing
a false death certificate. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 8. Since court decisions are decided on the particular facts and merits of
each case, no one was really sure why some cases were prosecuted and some were not. Id.
68. Id. For an overview on why the Dutch legislature is the better forum for resolving
issues "crowded [with] interest groups and advisory institutions," see Polak & Polak,
Faux Pas Or Pas De Deux? Recent Developments in the Relationship Between the Leg-
islature and the Judiciary in the Netherlands, 33 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 371, 408 (1986). It
should also be noted here that the concept of stare decisis does not exist in the Nether-
lands. While the Supreme Court usually follows previous decisions, as do the lower
courts, this is done as a matter of practice rather than procedure. THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE DUTCH LEGAL SYsTEM 6.
69. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 8.
70. Gevers, supra note 40, at 160.
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tor acts in "accordance with careful medical practice."7 The Commis-
sion also required that the patient's request to have his life terminated,
in addition to being made freely, must be given verbally, if at all possi-
ble." While a written request may be taken as indicative of a patient's
decision, it will only be considered relevant if the patient can no longer
orally express his intent." It was also recommended that the offense of
assisting a suicide, if done by a physician, be considered under the
same criteria as the terminating of life on request. 4 The Commission
included a proviso that the public prosecutor had to be notified by the
physician who performed the euthanasia. 5
Prior to the submission of the State Commission's report, a draft
bill decriminalizing euthanasia had been introduced to Parliament 6 by
one of the smaller political parties. 77 After the Commission's report
was published, the draft bill was revised to conform with the Commis-
sion's view .7  In January 1986, the Dutch government submitted its
own specimen bill to Parliament with a cover letter signed by the Min-
ister of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs and the Minister of Jus-
tice.7 " The Ministers' position was that they would "prefer" that the
Criminal Code not be changed at this time.80 The government's bill
71. Id. The requirements for "careful medical practice" are: a) The patient has to be
informed of his situation; b) The doctor must be convinced that the patient's request be
the result of careful consideration, and the request be made freely; c) In the doctor's
judgment, terminating the patient's life is justified because he and the patient are left
with no alternatives to the untenable situation; and d) Another physician must be con-
sulted. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 9.
72. Final Report of The Netherlands State Commission on Euthanasia: An English
Summary, 1 BIOETHICS 163, 167 (1987) [hereinafter Final Report].
73. Id. at 166 (The Report makes it clear that any written request can be revoked or
amended whenever the patient chooses.).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 170. The proviso also included the requirement that: 1) the physician sub-
mit a statement showing how the Criminal Code criteria had been met; 2) the consulting
physician submit a declaration supporting (or not) the findings of the attending physi-
cian; and 3) the attending physician could not write the death certificate. Id.
76. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 8. An "initiative" must be taken by a member of
Parliament before any bill can be put on the agenda for discussion. Id.
77. Id. The Netherlands has at least 22 different political parties representing the
entire political spectrum from extreme left-wing to extreme right-wing, including parties
based on religious affiliation. There are 150 seats in the Lower House of Parliament, with
the two or three parties having at least 30 seats usually combining to form "coalition"
voting blocks. The remaining seats are generally divided among 10 or 11 smaller parties
having two or three seats each. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE KINGDOM OF THE
NETHERLANDS: FACTS AND FIGURES-ELECTIONS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 11-19.
78. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 11.
79. AIDE-MEMOIRE, supra note 37, at 2.
80. Id. at 2-3.
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and the private member's bill were discussed in Parliament, which de-
cided to forward both bills to the Council of State (Council) for its
opinion, 1 which was published on January 16, 1987.82 The Council rec-
ommended that the laws prohibiting euthanasia remain, but that force
majeure (necessity) may be claimed by the doctor, provided that the
requirements for "careful medical practice and administrative rules"
are met.8
The recommendation made by the Council of State will probably
mean that euthanasia will not be legalized in the near future.8 " This
does not mean, however, that legislative action on the subject has
ceased. On September 17, 1987, a new draft bill lowering the maximum
penalty for euthanasia from twelve years to four years was submitted
to Parliament. 5
The feeling in the Netherlands is that any governmental move-
ment towards full legalization of euthanasia will be openly accepted by
the Dutch people in general,88 and by the Dutch medical practitioners
in particular.8 It has been said that the practice of euthanasia in the
Netherlands has already become a "fact of life and a way of death."88
III. THE UNITED STATES
In contrast to the Netherlands, the United States has taken a dif-
ferent approach to the issue of euthanasia. As previously discussed, the
Dutch legal system is premised on the notion of practical tolerance,
whereas in the United States, the limitations on an individual's per-
sonal freedom to choose death over life are generally weighed against
what is termed "the State's indirect and abstract interest in preserving
81. Id. at 3. The Council of State is the top "advisory body" to the Crown. The
Council is authorized to bring to the attention of the Crown any issue that might call for
legislative action. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS:
FACTS AND FIGURES-THE CONSTITUTION 13.
82. H. Leenen, supra note 44, at 11.
83. Id.
84. Gevers, supra note 40, at 161.
85. Telephone interview with H.J. de Roy van Zuydewijn, Secretary to the Health
Council of the Netherlands (Nov. 20, 1987).
86. H. van Zuydewijn, supra note 36, at 2. A recent poll showed that 68% of the
Dutch population as a whole, and 69% of Dutch Roman Catholics, are in favor of legaliz-
ing euthanasia so long as the State Commission's criteria are followed. Id.
87. Gevers, supra note 40, at 161. The Dutch Medical Association had advanced
changing the Penal Code if only to provide some measure of "legal certainty" to doctors
who might become involved with euthanasia cases. Id.
88. 60 Minutes: The Last Right (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 5, 1986) (transcript
on file at Journal Graphics Inc., 2 John St., N.Y., N.Y. 10038).
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the life of the competent patient.""9 The rights of the patient, and his
freedom to choose, are primarily based on constitutionally mandated
religious freedom, the right of "bodily self-determination" under com-
mon law, and the right of privacy." Cases dealing with religious free-
dom have involved the refusal of blood transfusions,91 the use of poi-
sonous snakes in religious practices,9 and compulsory vaccination."3
Although the constitutional right to religious freedom is considered
"absolute," it has not been free from government restraint. 4 For in-
stance, when the "public interest" is put in jeopardy, as in the compul-
sory vaccination cases, the courts have found that "[the] public inter-
est [is] considered paramount, without dissolution of respect for
religious beliefs."95
The right of bodily self-determination is a common law concept
giving an individual the power to control his own body unless, as stated
above, it can be overridden by a "compelling state interest." '96 This
power to control is an integral part of the doctrine of informed
consent.
9 7
The right of self-determination has since been merged into the
right of privacy." While the Constitution does not specifically mention
this right, prior Supreme Court decisions have held that a "right of
personal privacy exists and that certain areas of privacy are granted
under the Constitution."9 9 One of the main components of this right is
89. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 349, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987).
90. Note, The Right to Die-A Current Look, 30 Loy. L. REV. 139, 145-46 (1984).
91. Id. at 145.
92. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 36, 355 A.2d 647, 661, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Note, supra note 90, at 146. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
"no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
97. Id. The courts quantified this doctrine when they said: "[in] sum, the patient's
right to self-decision is the measure of the physician's duty to reveal. That right can be
effectively exercised only if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an in-
telligent choice." P. KEETON, R. KEETON, L. SARGENTICH & H. STEINER, TORT AND AccI-
DENT LAw 208 (1983) (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 295, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 515 (1972)).
98. Note, supra note 90, at 147.
99. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). "The Court in Griswold found the unwritten constitu-
tional right of privacy to exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
[Vol. 9
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the concept of "personal dignity,"'"0 including "physical integrity and
autonomy as well."10' Courts have held that this right was "broad
enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment
under certain circumstances.' 0 2 This individual right to decline medi-
cal treatment, even if it leads to death, is at the heart of court deci-
sions and legislative activity of the states. For the most part, the states
have affirmed this right of personal decision-making, now essentially
called the "right to die.'10 3
A. The Courts
The seminal case that addressed the correlative right of privacy
with the discontinuance of medical treatment was In re Quinlan.0 4
Karen Ann Quinlan was a twenty-one year old girl who was in a
"chronic, persistent, vegetative state."'' 08 Her father petitioned the
court to be appointed guardian and to be allowed to discontinue all
"extraordinary procedures" designed to keep his daughter alive.106 The
court held that the patient's decision "to permit a non-cognitive, vege-
tative existence to terminate by natural forces was a valuable incident
of her right to privacy.' 0 7 Of equal importance to later cases and legis-
lation was the additional ruling that Ms. Quinlan's right to privacy
could be claimed on her behalf by her father, provided he was the
guardian appointed by the court.'0 The court found no "external" in-
terest of the state contrary to the patient's rights,'0 9 and that the pa-
stance." 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965)).
100. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307
(Ct. App. 1986).
101. Note, supra note 90, at 147.
102. 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663 (1976).
103. Note, supra note 90, at 178. This is to be contrasted with the judicial and legis-
lative structure in the Netherlands which is conducted on a nationally-based system
rather than a state-based system. Gevers, supra note 40, at 165.
104. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
105. 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.
106. Id. at 11, 355 A.2d at 647.
107. Id.
108. Id. The patient's right to choose would normally have to be asserted by the
patient. In this case, however, the court felt that the only way to protect Ms. Quinlan's
rights was to allow her guardian and family, using their best judgment, to decide whether
she would have wanted to suspend treatment. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
109. 109. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. Further, the court stated that no interest of the
state could "compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable
months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient
life." Id.
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tient's right to privacy expands as the "degree of bodily invasion in-
creases and the prognosis dims."' 0 The court appointed her father,
Joseph Quinlan, as guardian and, provided certain conditions were
met, held that the life-support system keeping Ms. Quinlan alive could
be withdrawn."' Since Ms. Quinlan's death would be from the previ-
ously existing natural causes, it would not be classified as homicide and
thus would be free from any civil or criminal liability."
The next important issue that the American courts had to con-
sider was whether to add the "nasogastric tube" to the types of treat-
ment that could be withdrawn under the criteria determined in Quin-
lan.'1 3 In 1983, the Superior Court of New Jersey approved the
removal of the feeding tube from an eighty-four-year-old patient who
was in a vegetative state." The decision was reversed by the appellate
division, which held that:
[s]ince [the] patient was not in a chronic vegetative state, but
was simply very confused, [the] bodily invasion [the] patient
suffered as [a] result of her treatment was small and death by
dehydration and starvation would be painful, [the] state's
interest in preserving life, and thus removal of [the] nasogas-
tric tube . . . would be improper."'
In the same year, the California Court of Appeals issued a writ of
prohibition restraining a lower court from taking any action on murder
and conspiracy charges against two doctors who disconnected a pa-
tient's life-support system and feeding tubes at the request of the pa-
tient's family.11 6 Since 1983, the addition of the nasogastric tube to the
110. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Ms. Quinlan required "[twenty-four] hour intensive
nursing care, antibiotics, the assistance of a respirator, a catheter and feeding tube." Id.
111. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. The court's conditions were: 1) The attending
physicians must conclude that there was no "reasonable" possibility of Ms. Quinlan ever
emerging from her coma; 2) the attending physician must consult with an "Ethics Com-
mittee," set up by the hospital; and 3) this committee must also agree that there is no
reasonable possibility of Ms. Quinlan's recovery. Id.
112. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672. The court stated that "the termination of treatment
pursuant to the right of privacy is, within the limitations of this case, ipso facto lawful.
Thus, a death resulting from such an act would not come within the scope of the homi-
cide statute proscribing only the unlawful killing of another." Id. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at
670.
113. Note, supra note 90, at 154. This "nasogastric tube" is used to supply nutri-
tional sustenance to patients who are in a coma and cannot eat or drink, and is a mecha-
nism which is likened to basic nourishment. See id. at 155.
114. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (Ch. Div. 1983).
115. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (App. Div. 1983).
116. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App.
1983).
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types of treatment allowed to be withdrawn has been affirmed in a
number of jurisdictions, including the states of Washington," 7 Flor-
ida,118 California," s Massachusetts,' 2 0 and New York.1 2 '
On June 24, 1987, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, considered a
respected pioneer in this area of law,122 released three separate deci-
sions confirming the judicial acceptance of an individual's right to
choose not to receive either artificial maintenance or nasogastric suste-
nance. 12 These decisions constitute the essential nature of passive/vol-
untary euthanasia because there is consent (although in some cases
transferred) and the act is the withdrawing of life-sustaining
apparatuses.
1 24
It is still true that American criminal law treats active euthanasia
as homicide. 2 5 Even if it is done for altruistic motives, that is, to "mer-
cifully" end intense suffering, the act is considered premeditated and
deliberate.2 8 The case that received the most notoriety in recent years
was Gilbert v. Florida.1 27 Roswell Gilbert, at age seventy-five, was con-
victed of first degree murder for killing his wife and sentenced to life
imprisonment.12 8 She was suffering from Alzheimer's Disease and oste-
oporosis.2 9 The combination of the two afflictions left her in constant
pain and sometimes confused. 2 0 Mr. Gilbert could no longer take care
of her, and felt that putting her in a nursing home, separated from
117. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
118. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
119. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App.
1986).
120. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
121. Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677
(App. Div. 1987). It should be noted here that only one year prior to the Delio decision,
the Supreme Court of Nassau County refused to allow the removal of a nasogastric tube
from a patient who was found to be neither terminally ill nor brain dead. In addition, it
was uncertain whether his comatose condition was irreversible or not. See Vogel v. For-
man, 134 Misc. 2d 395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
122. Right to Die, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 120-21.
123. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529
A.2d 419 (1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
124. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 535-37.
125. Id. at 540.
126. Id.
127. 487 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
128. Id. at 1187. Absent any legislative changes, the court was unable to take into
account any of the mitigating circumstances that might have allowed them some discre-
tion in sentencing Mr. Gilbert. These circumstances included his age and the fact that he
had been a respected, peaceful, law-abiding citizen up until the time of the incident. Id.
at 1192.
129. Id. at 1187.
130. Id.
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him, would amount to a "horrible death for her."' 3 ' On March 4, 1986,
he shot her, as he put it, to "terminate her suffering.'13 2 The court
stated that "euthanasia is not a defense to first degree murder in Flor-
ida and this court has been furnished with no law or statute to the
contrary.' 3
B. The Legislature
The issue of passive euthanasia is not new to state legislatures,
although early movements toward some degree of state control were
unsuccessful.'3" Starting in 1976, with the enactment in California of
the Natural Death Act,3 5 other states have followed with their own
version of similar legislation. These "right to die" statutes are designed
to legitimize the concept of a "living will.' 36s This living will, almost
always a written document,/ 7 establishes a "method whereby an adult
person may execute a directive for withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures."138
The living will statutes have two basic components. First, they al-
low a person to prepare, in advance of any medical treatment, a docu-
ment that "clearly" provides direction for their care in the event of a
terminal condition and second, to "establish clear guidelines to protect
physicians from liability.""' 9 All of the statutes require that the patient
must be terminally ill before withdrawal will be allowed."'4 Some stat-
utes allow an oral statement to be considered as a declaration of a pa-
tient's desires, providing it is witnessed by at least two people, one of
131. Id. at 1188. It should be added that the Gilberts had been married for over 50
years. Id. at 1187.
132. Id. at 1188. He went on to say that "I could take care of whatever happens to me
and it's happening right now and that was of no consequence to me .... I know I was
breaking the law .... So it's murder. So what?" Id.
133. Id. at 1190. This author knows of no American jurisdiction where acts such as
Mr. Gilbert's have been explicitly condoned.
134. Note, supra note 90, at 143.
135. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1987).
136. Note, supra note 1, at 556.
137. Id.
138. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1139, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302
(Ct. App. 1986).
139. News From Society For The Right To Die 1, 1-2 (June 1987) [hereinafter Soci-
ety Newsletter]; see also Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101
to -113 (Supp. 1986). "No physician signing a certificate of terminal condition or with-
holding or withdrawing life-sustaining procedures in compliance with a declaration shall
be subject to civil liability, criminal penalty, or licensing sanctions therefor." Id. § 15-18-
110(b).
140. Note, supra note 1, at 558.
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whom is "neither a spouse nor a blood relative. '14 1 If the declaration is
oral, and satisfies the witness requirement, the attending physician
must include it in the patient's medical record.1 2 The statutes also
make provisions for incompetent patients by allowing the next of kin
or legal guardian to give their substituted consent. 4 s Some states have
allowed substituted consent to be extended to cover a terminally ill
minor. 44
While some statutes prohibit the withdrawal of sustenance, this
prohibition is reserved for patients who are not in a terminal condi-
tion.4 5 In addition, the absence of a sustenance provision has not pre-
cluded the courts from interpreting the statutes as including such a
provision. 4 In 1986, the American Medical Association's Judicial
Council also included tubal feeding among the life-prolonging treat-
ments that could be withdrawn."'
As of June 1987, thirty-nine states have enacted some form of liv-
ing will statute." 8 Legislation has also been proposed in ten of the re-
maining states, with Kentucky and Ohio being the only two states to
have no such statute or proposed legislation." 9 A poll of two thousand
people taken by the American Medical Association prompted the poll
analyst to state "the American people want to have uniform living will
provisions in every state, durable power of attorney provisions in every
state, and an ongoing national public education program in place to
make the public aware of these . . . documents." 50
141. See Life-Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. § 765.03-.04 (1986). It is interest-
ing to note that in Gilbert, the defendant attempted to use his wife's complaints of "I'm
so sick . . . I want to die" as indicative of her intent. Mrs. Gilbert had left no "mercy
will" nor did she express any definitive intent in that direction. Gilbert v. State, 487 So.
2d 1185, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
142. Natural Death Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1987).
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (Supp. 1987).
144. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.6 (West Supp. 1987).
145. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (Supp. 1987).
146. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). While the
Florida statute specifically excludes sustenance within the definition of life-prolonging
procedures, the court found that they were "unable to differentiate between the multi-
tude of artificial devices that may be available to prolong the moment of death." Id. at
371.
147. Society Newsletter, supra note 139, at 2.
148. Id. at 1.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5.
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IV. CONCERNS
The concerns held by opponents of any euthanasia legislation are
generally the same in both the Netherlands and the United States.
There is fear that the law will be authorizing a "legal right of execu-
tion."'' By the "blas6 acceptance"'8 2 of euthanasia, will euthanasia
legislation lead to the elimination of those thought to be no longer use-
ful or productive?' " The critics contend that by allowing any form of
euthanasia, we are "sliding down the slope to social Darwinism,"'15
leading to the possibility that elderly and "defective" members of soci-
ety will become the law's victims. 5  They point to the atrocities under
the Nazi regime as proof of their claims, for what started in Germany
as a "voluntary practice" ultimately became a tool of genocide.'56 Even
with the vast array of diagnostic tools available to physicians, what if
their prognosis for recovery is wrong? 5 7 Physicians opposed to legisla-
tion raise the point that their act is irreversible.5 5
With the onslaught of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), a disease which is presently incurable, a new problem faces the
government of the Netherlands. They do not want their country to be-
come a haven for AIDS sufferers who might be looking for "easy ac-
cess" to painless euthanasia.'59 The Dutch government has tried to em-
phasize that AIDS sufferers "are most often being offered passive
methods of awaiting death, by reducing normal emergency and inten-
sive-care procedures."' 60 In a recent court decision in New York State,
an AIDS patient's life-sustaining medical treatment was continued,
contrary to his living will.'' The court ruled that although there was
no possibility of the patient recovering from AIDS, the AIDS-related
151. Note, supra note 1, at 543.
152. Clines, supra note 50, at A4, col. 4.
153. Otten, supra note 20, at 6, col. 4; see also Note, supra note 1, at 543.
154. Otten, supra note 20, at 6, col. 4.
155. Note, supra note 1, at 543.
156. Id. at 544. The German public "never believed that the merciful act of euthana-
sia would be abused and utilized as a weapon to cause such horrifying results." Id.; see
also Aly & Roth, supra note 3, at 153. These commentators mention that in 1939, in a
law proposed by the German Ministry of Justice's Commission of Criminal Law, the first
paragraph read: "[any person suffering from an incurable illness seriously hindering
himself or others, or leading to certain death may, upon his own express wish and with
the permission of a specially authorized physician, have access to mercy killing." Id.
157. Note, supra note 1, at 544.
158. Id.
159. Clines, Dutch Fear: AIDS Cases' Last Stop, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at A12,
col. 1.
160. Id. at col. 2.
161. N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1.
[Vol. 9
EUTHANASIA: HOLLAND AND THE U.S.
illness he had could probably be successfully treated.'6 2
The Netherlands does not want to be the only country in the
world to condone active euthanasia. " Both countries do not want the
"right to choose" by the individual to become the right of others to
choose for them.'
V. CONCLUSION
The concepts of both active and passive euthanasia, as practiced
in the Netherlands and the United States respectively, are based on an
individual's right to decide his or her own fate, regardless of the inter-
est the state might have in that person's welfare. By carefully control-
ling the criteria necessary for the elimination of criminal liability and
keeping the excesses of the past in constant view, both countries might
succeed in honoring their citizens' rights without jeopardizing their cit-
izens' futures.
Peter Zisser
162. Id.
163. AIDE-MEMOIRE, supra note 37, at 3.
164. Note, supra note 1, at 543.
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